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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented by the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is whether the petitioners have demonstrated any 
special and important reasons that would justify review of the 
Court of Appeals' decision. As demonstrated herein, there are no 
such special and important reasons. The Court of Appeals 
correctly ruled that: 
(a) The trial court failed to apply the correct measure of 
damages to the established facts, and 
(b) The attorneys7 fee provisions in this case provided for 
an award of attorneys' fees to Golwix Properties1 but did not 
contain a "prevailing party" provision that would provide the 
basis for any award of attorneys' fees to Stacey. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a real estate transaction in which Golwix 
has been cittempting to enforce its contractual rights against 
Stacey for nearly five years. Golwix has proven that Stacey 
blatantly breached several warranties and covenants contained in 
the Agreement between the parties, yet Stacey continues to delay 
the resolution of this case. Stacey's petition to this court is 
simply another attempt to prolong this matter and prevent Golwix 
from receiving the recovery to which it is entitled. 
Respondents operate their real estate investment business 
under the name of Golwix Properties. For clarity and 
convenience, this brief will refer to respondents as "Golwix 
Properties" or simply "Golwix". 
1 
Stacey's so called "Statement of Facts Relevant to this 
Petition" mischaracterizes rulings of the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals, misstates facts, and contains numerous 
allegations that are completely irrelevant to the questions 
presented by the petition. Stacey's obvious intent is to cloud 
the record in an effort to convince this court that factual 
questions were reviewed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of 
Appeals, however, did not review or disturb any factual findings 
but merely ruled on questions of law. A correct summary of the 
facts relevant to the petition is nevertheless necessary for this 
court to understand that this is not an appropriate case for 
certiorari review. 
On May 22, 1984 Golwix Properties entered into a letter 
agreement (the "Agreement")2 with Stacey to purchase certain 
commercial properties. (Findings and Conclusions «[ 1, R-496.)3 
As partial payment for the properties, Golwix executed a 
promissory note (the "Note") on the same date. (Id. f 2, 
R-496.)A The terms of the Note provided offset rights to Golwix 
to ensure performance by Stacey of the warranties and covenants 
contained in the Agreement. 
2The Agreement is included in the addendum to this brief as 
Exhibit "A". 
3The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are included in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit "B". 
Citations to the record are given in the form of "R-" and the 
page number. For clarity, citations to the Transcript on Appeal 
are distinguished by the designation "TR-" and the page number. 
4The Note is included in the addendum as Exhibit "C". 
2 
Shortly after Golwix took possession of the properties, a 
large air-conditioning unit at one of the properties was found to 
be inoperable. (Id. tf ll.a(l) and (4) R-499.) The trial court 
made specific factual findings that the air-conditioning unit was 
not in working order and operative on the date of the closing of 
the transaction in breach of the terms of the Agreement. (Id. % 
13.a(l), R-502.) The trial court further found that Stacey had 
failed to make repairs to the unit after being notified that the 
unit was inoperable (id. t ll.a(4), R-499), and that Golwix 
Properties incurred an expense of $22,758 to replace the unit 
(id. 1 ll.a(5), R-499). 
The evidence presented at trial indicated that soon after 
the closing Golwix was notified that the air conditioner was not 
functioning. Golwix quickly responded to the problem by sending 
air-conditioning specialists to investigate. (TR-170-71.) The 
specialists inspected the unit and attempted repairs. 
(TR-171-76.) The repairs were unsuccessful, however, because 
repeated leaks in the condenser coil over the years had resulted 
in serious damage to the compressor unit and other parts of the 
system. (TR-208-10.) Golwix's air-conditioning expert testified 
that he investigated the cost of repairing the unit to make it 
operative and estimated such cost to be $19,000 to $2 0,000. 
(TR-211.) Because the repair cost nearly equalled the cost of a 
new unit, replacement was the most reasonable and prudent course 
of action. (TR-215.) Consequently, Golwix reasonably incurred 
the actual cost of $22,750 to replace the unit. (Findings and 
3 
Conclusions % ll.a(5), R-499.) The trial court, however, only 
awarded damages in the amount of $5,689.50 with respect to the 
air conditioner, reasoning that "the unit would have had 
approximately 25% of its useful life remaining under normal 
conditions." (Id. % 11.a(3) , R-499.) 
Golwix was awarded damages on its other counterclaims in 
addition to the air-conditioning unit damages. Because the total 
damage award exceeded the total of the unpaid installments under 
the Note (jld. 1 6, R-497) , the trial court refused to accelerate 
the Note and the Complaint was dismissed for no cause of action 
(Judgment % 4). 5 
The trial court refused to consider the application for 
costs and attorneys' fees by any party. Stacey was denied costs 
and fees because it did not prevail on its Complaint. (Findings 
and Conclusions % 20, R-506.) The trial court concluded that 
Golwix "would be entitled to an award of attorneys7 fees if [it] 
had simply defended the case successfully, but [is] not entitled 
to an award of fees because [it] did not prevail on many of its 
counterclaims." (Id. % 21, R-506.) 
Stacey appealed the judgment of the trial court and Golwix 
Properties filed a cross appeal. The appeal was transferred by 
this court to the Court of Appeals for disposition. The Court of 
Appeals ruled that (1) the trial court had properly determined 
that the Promissory Note could not be accelerated; (2) the trial 
3A copy of the Judgment is included in the addendum as 
Exhibit "D". 
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court had applied an incorrect measure of damages regarding 
Golwix's counterclaim for the air-conditioning unit; (3) Stacey 
was not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees because it did 
not prevail on its Complaint for acceleration; and (4) Golwix was 
entitled to attorneys' fees for the claims on which it was 
successful under the terms of the Agreement between the parties.6 
ARGUMENT 
PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY 
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE 
EXTRAORDINARY GRANT OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Rule 4 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (which was 
added effective April 20, 1987), sets forth the considerations 
governing review by a Writ of Certiorari: 
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the 
charcicter of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision in conflict 
with a decision of another panel of the 
Court of Appeals on the same issue of 
law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has decided a question of state or 
federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of this 
court;. . . . 
R. Utah S. Ct. Rule 43 (emphasis added). 
This court has not taken the opportunity to elaborate on the 
considerations set forth in Rule 4 3 so it is useful to review 
6The opinion of the Court of Appeals is included in the 
addendum to this brief as Exhibit "E". 
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decisions interpreting the comparable federal provisions. 
Shortly after passage of the federal statutory writ of 
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court established the 
foundations of certiorari doctrine: 
While this power is coextensive with all possible 
necessities and sufficient to secure to this court a 
final control over the litigation in all the Courts of 
Appeal, it is a power which will be sparingly 
exercised, and only when the circumstances of the case 
satisfy us that the importance of the question 
involved, the necessity of avoiding conflict between 
two or more courts of appeal, or between courts of 
appeal and the courts of a state, or some matter 
affecting the interests of this nation in its internal 
or external relations, demands such exercise, 
Forsyth v. Hammond. 166 U.S. 506, 515 (1897) (emphasis added). 
The limited exercise of discretion described by the United States 
Supreme Court serves important public and institutional policies 
that are just as applicable to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Widespread certiorari review undermines the finality and 
reliability of decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals. 
Moreover, broad review would defeat the institutional policy of 
rationing the limited resources of the Supreme Court. As noted 
by Professors Wright & Miller, 
In most circumstances, the Supreme Court exercises its 
discretion on the assumption that it cannot function as 
an ordinary appellate court concerned with achieving 
individual justice in individual cases. . . . As the 
number of cases seeking review has grown, the docket 
has had to be devoted more and more to constitutional 
and statutory questions that are likely to have 
widespread general impact. 
16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4004, at 507-08 (1977). 
6 
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in this case runs 
directly contrary to the policies that underlie discretionary 
review and the role of this court. Stacey has not presented this 
court with any issues of widespread general impact that would 
justify the expenditure of this court's precious resources. 
Indeed, a grant of the petition would simply undermine the 
credibility and usefulness of the Court of Appeals as an 
important part of this state's judicial system. 
The simple fact is that Stacey is unhappy with the Court of 
Appeals' decision and has attempted to contrive reasons for this 
court to exercise its discretion to grant review. As 
demonstrated below, however, this case involves issues of narrow 
application which were correctly decided by the Court of Appeals 
in a manner fully consistent with Utah law. 
A. The Court of Appeals Carefully Followed the Prior Decisions 
of this Court in Ruling that the District Court Applied an 
Incorrect Measure of Damages. 
Stacey first contends that the Court of Appeals erred by 
purportedly disturbing the trial court's factual findings 
regarding Golwix's counterclaim for the air-conditioning unit. 
After starting with the false premise that factual determinations 
are at issue, Stacey goes on to argue that the Court of Appeals' 
ruling is in conflict with prior decisions of this court which 
constrain an appellate court from disturbing a trial court's fact 
findings. The technique of Stacey's argument is nothing more 
than setting up a straw man and knocking the straw man down. The 
Court of Appeals did not question, address, or disturb any of the 
7 
trial court 's fact findings regarding damages. Rather, the Court 
of Appeals reviewed the measure of damages applied by the 
District Court and concluded, as a matter of law, that the 
proportionate award of damages with respect to the air 
conditioner was the incorrect legal standard. 
With respect to the damages issue, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned as follows: 
Damages recoverable in a breach of contract action are 
generally "those which arise naturally from the breach 
and which reasonably may be supposed to have been within 
the contemplation of the parties or are reasonably 
foreseeable." Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 
1982). "Damages are properly measured by the amount 
necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract had been performed." 
Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court likewise apportioned the actual 
replacement cost of the air conditioner. Golwix was 
awarded twenty-five percent of the replacement cost of 
$22,758, or $5,689.50. The court held that Golwix would 
"receive a windfall" if Stacey was held responsible for 
the full replacement cost. The award, however, fails to 
"place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if 
the contract had been performed." Alexander, 646 P.2d at 
695. Golwix contracted for a cooling system that was to 
be operable on the day of closing. What it received was 
an air conditioner that was not in working order on that 
date. Since the evidence indicates that the reasonable 
cost of repairing the unit would have been between 
$19,000 and $20,000, the court's award was insufficient 
to afford Golwix the benefit of its bargain. For that 
reason, the award for the air conditioner should be 
increased, on remand, to reflect the reasonable cost of 
repair. 
(Court of Appeals decision at 5.) 
Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision did not involve any 
assessment of the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the 
witnesses, or the reversal of any factual determination. The 
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court merely determined that the trial court had not applied the 
measure of damages required by the decisions of this court. The 
cases cited by Stacey concerning the appellate court's limited 
review of factual determinations are, therefore, inapplicable.7 
This court has observed that: 
The determination of the trial court on damages will not 
be reversed if it is supported by substantial evidence in 
the record. We will, however, reverse a trial court if 
there is a misapplication of the law to the established 
facts. 
Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 71 (Utah 1982) 
(emphasis added). The uncontroverted evidence at trial 
demonstrated that Golwix was forced to incur the actual cost of 
$22,758 to replace an air-conditioning unit that could not have 
been made operative without incurring a repair cost of $19,000 to 
$20,000. (Findings and Conclusions «[ ll.a(5), R-499; TR-211-12; 
TR-215.) Of course, Golwix selected the only economically 
reasonable alternative and replaced the unit for slightly more 
than the necessary repair cost. Those facts were established. 
7The cases cited by Stacey as purportedly inconsistent with 
the Court of Appeals decision here are not inconsistent at all. 
See, e.g. , Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction, Inc., 682 P.2d 287 
(Utah 1984) (holding that damage award may be set aside if "the 
trial court neglected pertinent elements"; the measure of damages 
was not at issue); Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah 1983) 
(reviewing whether substantial evidence supported the damage 
award; the measure of damages was not at issue); Clayton v. 
Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (court 
reviewed the measure of damages and concluded that the proper 
measure had been applied; two justices dissented on the grounds 
that the trial court had applied the wrong damage measure); 
Arnold Machinery Co. v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 246, 
357 P.2d 496 (1960) (stating that jury was not required to accept 
certain evidence of damages; the court did not even consider the 
issue of whether the correct measure of damages was used). 
9 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court 
misapplied the law concerning the correct measure of damages to 
those established facts. An award of a percentage of the cost of 
the new unit failed to put Golwix in as good a position as if the 
contract had been performed, i.e. having an air-conditioning unit 
that was in working order and operative. The Court of Appeals' 
decision was, therefore, correct and in no way departs from any 
of the decisions of this court. 
B. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Specific 
Contractual Provisions Governing Attorneys' Fees in this Case 
is Fully Consistent with other Case Law. 
1. Stacev was not Entitled to Recover its Attorneys' Fees 
because the Note does not Contain a "Prevailing Party" 
Provision. 
Stacey contends that the Court of Appeals' construction of 
the attorneys' fee provision contained in the Note was wrong. 
The relevant provision of the Note provides as follows: 
Makers agree to pay any and all costs and expenses 
(regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether 
incurred with or without suit or before or after 
judgment, including reasonable attorneys' fees) which may 
be incurred by or in connection with the enforcement or 
performance of any of the rights of Properties 
hereunder. . . . 
(Promissory Note at 2 (emphasis added).) The trial court 
concluded that "Plaintiff did not prevail on its complaint for 
acceleration and is therefore not entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees." (Findings and Conclusions % 2 0.) The Court of 
Appeals agreed with that conclusion, ruling as follows: 
We consider this finding to be in accord with the 
language of the note, i.e., Golwix will pay attorneys' 
fees in connection with the enforcement of Stacey's 
rights under the note. Since Stacey's attempt to 
10 
accelerate the note was unsuccessful, Stacey was properly 
denied its attorneys' fees." 
(Court of Appeals opinion at 6.) 
Stacey argues that the language of the Note entitled Stacey 
to receive a percentage of its attorneys' fees incurred in 
successfully defending against some of the counterclaims of 
Golwix. That argument was properly rejected by the Court of 
Appeals. This court consistently has held that attorneys' fees 
may be recovered only where there is a specific statutory or 
contractual basis for such an award. See, e.g., Espinoza v. 
Safeco Title Insurance Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979). 
Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to a contract can be allowed 
"only in accordance with the terms of the contract." Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah 1982). The terms of the Note do not permit recovery of 
attorneys' fees where Stacey has not prevailed in enforcing the 
right of acceleration under the Note. The only right under the 
Note that Stacey sought to enforce by way of its complaint was 
the right to acceleration upon default. Having failed on that 
issue, Stacey is not entitled to any award of fees. 
Stacey's argument and the cases cited by Stacey in support of 
its argument for an award of attorneys' fees would apply if the 
Note or the Agreement included a "prevailing party" attorneys' 
fee provision. Such a provision, however, does not exist here. 
This court has repeatedly refused to construe attorneys' fee 
provisions to award fees to a prevailing party absent express 
11 
language setting forth such a requirement. See, e.g., Falkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) (refusing to apply cases 
interpreting "prevailing party77 language to a contract awarding 
fees against a 77defaulting party77) . In Trayner v. Cushing, 688 
P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), a case cited by Stacey in its petition, 
this court held that 77a party is entitled only to those fees 
attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights 
within the terms of their agreement.7/ Id. at 858 (emphasis 
added). In the Trayner case, both parties argued that they were 
entitled to attorneys7 fees and cited several cases referring to 
attorneys7 fees provisions. This court stated as follows: 
Counsel for both parties cite and discuss cases awarding 
attorneys7 fees to the 77prevailing party77 or to the party 
77not in default77. Neither of these phrases was used in 
the agreement before us. These parties have agreed 
instead to the payment of attorneys7 fees in an action 
brought to "enforce77 the agreement "or any right arising 
out of the breach thereof77. 
Id. at 858. 
The Court of Appeals carefully followed the prior decisions 
of this court by applying the language contained in the Note and 
not by inferring a "prevailing party" provision as urged by 
Stacey. 
2. Golwix was Entitled to an Award of Attorneys7 Fees for 
Successfully Enforcing its Rights as Provided by the 
Agreement. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in 
failing to award attorneys7 fees to Golwix for successfully 
vindicating its rights under the Agreement. Stacey argues that 
the Court of Appeals7 decision in this regard was wrong because 
12 
the applicable section of the Agreement is entitled "Indemnity". 
From that label, Stacey makes an illogical and enormous leap in 
reasoning to conclude that the label renders invalid the language 
of the provision and limits any recovery of attorneys7 fees to 
instances where Golwix may be defending against claims asserted 
by third parties. This leap in reasoning cannot be used as a 
basis for any conclusion that special and important reasons exist 
to warrant certiorari review* 
Stacey7s arguments are belied by the plain language of the 
Agreement which Stacey carefully avoids quoting. Section 17 of 
the Agreement contains a broad attorneys7 fee provision: 
[Stacey] agree[s] to indemnify . . . and reimburse you 
. . . for . . . any claim, liability, obligation, loss, 
damage, deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost, or 
expense (including without limitation reasonable 
attorneys7 fees and expenses, and costs and expenses 
reasonably incurred, in investigating, preparing, or 
defending against any litigation or claim), . . . arising 
out of or in any manner incident, relating or 
attributable to: 
a. any breach or failure of any 
representation or warranty given by us . . .; 
b. any failure of either of us to perform or 
observe, or to have performed or observed, in 
full, any covenant, agreement, or condition to be 
performed or observed by us under this agreement 
. . .; or 
d. the enforcement of your rights under this 
agreement. 
As observed by the Court of Appeals, this language "is 
expansively written, encompassing a broad range of potential 
expenses connected with rights arising under the contract." 
(Court of Appeals7 opinion at 7.) Thus, the label "indemnity" 
does not limit the obligation to reimburse attorneys7 fees and 
13 
costs to those instances where claims are asserted by third 
parties. Rather, the language requires Stacey to indemnify and 
reimburse Golwix for attorneys7 fees and costs incurred in 
enforcing all of its rights under the Agreement regardless of the 
source of the loss. If the parties had intended to limit the 
scope of the Agreement to claims asserted by third parties, they 
certainly could have stated that intention. However, the parties 
expressly agreed that Stacey would indemnify and reimburse Golwix 
for attorneys7 fees incurred in 7/anv litigation77 in which Golwix 
enforces its rights under the Agreement. 
Stacey further attempts to convince this court that the Court 
of Appeals7 decision is inconsistent with Utah law regarding the 
law of indemnification by citing cases involving common law 
claims for implied indemnification. Stacey cites Perry v. 
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), for the 
proposition that a claim for indemnification is different than a 
claim for breach of contract or warranty, and further cites 
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 
1988), for the rule that an indemnitee cannot recover attorneys7 
fees incurred in establishing its right to indemnity. Those 
cases and the other indemnity cases cited by Stacey, however, are 
inapposite. 
The cases cited by Stacey pertain to common law causes of 
action for implied indemnity. None of Stacey7s cases concern 
contractual indemnity or the interpretation of a contractual 
indemnification provision. The law governing implied 
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indemnification or the right to recover attorneys' fees for 
enforcing implied indemnification rights have no application 
where a specific contractual agreement between the parties 
establishes such rights. 
Parties may make a contractual indemnification provision as 
broad as they desire. Indeed, common law rules of 
indemnification are abrogated or superceded in an action based on 
an indemnity contract. See, e.g., Juneau v. Alaska Electric 
Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d 954, 956 (Alaska 1981); Rossmoor 
Sanitation v. Pylon, Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 532 P.2d 97 
(1975). A contract of indemnification is subject to the same 
rules of construction applicable to all contracts. See, e.g.f 
Chetopa State Bancshares, Inc. v. Fox, 6 Kan. App. 2d 326, 628 
P.2d 249 (1981); 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 6, at 691 (1968). 
The Court of Appeals' construction of the specific provision 
at issue in this case was absolutely correct. The provision 
plainly requires Stacey to pay Golwix's attorneys' fees incurred 
in enforcing its rights under the Agreement regardless of the 
source of the claim or the nature of the attorneys' fees. The 
Court of Appeals properly looked to the terms of the Agreement 
between the parties in concluding that Golwix was entitled to 
recover the attorneys' fees incurred in successfully vindicating 
its rights under the Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
No special and important reasons exist in this case for this 
court to grant a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Not only was 
15 
the decision of the Court of Appeals correct, the decision does 
not conflict in any way with prior decisions of this court or 
with decisions from another panel of the Court of Appeals. 
Furthermore, the case does not involve any issues of widespread 
and significant importance that would justify the expenditure of 
this court's limited resources. Rather, the case concerns the 
interpretation of specific contractual provisions that are unique 
to this case. Any further review would only serve to undermine 
the importance of the Court of Appeals and the finality of its 
decisions. For the foregoing reasons, Golwix Properties 
respectfully submits that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
must be denied. * 
DATED this gr day of April, 1989. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
By: V] )\J vv^ 
Ronald/G. Russell, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the )^--^ ctay of April, 1989 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101^ 
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May 1, 1984 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
Ms. Francine A. Wixen 
Dr. Bernie Goler 
Ms. Bonnie Goler 
1911 South Commerce Center, B. 
Suite 211 
San Bernadino, California 92408 
Dear Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Dr. and Ms. Goler: 
This letter is written to set forth the terms of our 
agreement this date relating to the sale by Stacey Properties, 
a Utah Limited Partnership, and me to you as tenants in common. 
1. Property Sold 
The properties to be sold include the following: 
a. Commonwealth Square Shopping Center, Units 
1-18, inclusive. 
b. Pizza Hut, Ogden, Utah. 
c. Eastern Winds Restaurant, Ogden, Utah. 
d. Jiffy Lube Center, Ogden, Utah 
e. Post Office Building, Ogden, Utah. 
All of the said properties are more fully described in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. The properties have been 
inspected by you and are purchased "as is". Said buildings 
vary from the plans, specifications and building contracts 
being delivered to you only as set forth on Exhibit B attached 
hereto and in other minor ways which do not materially affect 
the said properties. We agree to remedy any latent defects in 
EXHIBIT "A" 
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materials or workmanship which arise within a one year period 
from the date of closing. We represent and warrant to you that 
all heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sewer systems at 
the properties are in working order and will be operative at 
closing and that the footings and foundations are free from 
material structural defects. We further warrant to you that 
the roof at the Eastern Winds and Pizza Hut Restaurants are 
free of any defects in workmanship and material and we warrant 
that we will make any reasonably necessary repairs to said 
roofs required at any time within five years from the date of. 
closing which arise as a direct result of defects in 
workmanship or materials. We further warrant to you that the 
roof at Commonwealth Square is free of any defects in 
workmanship and material and we warrant that we will make any 
reasonably necessary repairs to said roof required at any time 
within one year from the date of closing which arise as a 
direct result of defects in workmanship or materials. We will 
perform all necessary repairs to the roof of the Post Office 
building which are reasonably required to maintain a water 
tight roof surface for a period of sixty seven months from the 
date of closing at our sole cost and expense. 
2. Purchase Price 
The purchase price for all of the foregoing property 
is a total of $3,530,104.95. We will pay sales taxes directly 
attributable to the sale of personal property sold to you 
hereunder. The said purchase price is payable according to the 
following terms and at the times indicated: 
a. $10,000 cash paid this date, to our 
attorneys, Berman & Anderson, to be held in their 
trust account. 
b. The sum of $242,000.00 to be paid at the 
time of closing in cash funds (said amount to be 
increased or reduced for any reduction or increase, 
respectively, in the amount set forth in (e) hereafter 
which occurs prior to closing or for prorations set 
forth in paragraph 4). 
c. The sum of $80,000 evidenced by a promissory 
note payable to Stacey Properties in the form set 
forth in Exhibit "CM attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
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d. The sum of $2,900,000.00 paid to First 
Security Bank in accordance with the terms of a loan 
transaction set forth in detail in a letter from First 
Security Bank of Utah to each of you dated March 27, 
1984. First Security Bank will require and you agree 
to execute a deed of trust.and promissory note in form 
acceptable to the bank which said documents will be in 
accordance with the terms of your separate agreement 
with the bank dated March 27, 1984. 
e. Assumption of Post Office building mortgage 
in the amount of approximately $298,104.95 to State 
Savings and Loan Association which you will assume and 
agree to pay. 
3. Conveyance 
The properties shall be conveyed, an undivided 
one-half interest to Dr. and Mrs. Goler and an undivided 
one-half interest as part of a Section 1031 exchange 
transaction involving Mr. and Mrs. Wixen and Val Ban Corp., 
each conveyance by a general warranty deed from the Sellers to 
the grantees. 
Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have the right, without the 
need of any further approval or consent of us prior to the 
completion of the purchase of the subject property to transfer 
and assign all of their rights and obligations under this 
agreement to Val Ban Corp., a California corporation. 
Val Ban Corp., pursuant to the contractual obligation 
to purchase the subject property hereunder in accordance with 
the terms and provisions of that certain agreement of exchange 
entered into between Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Val Ban Corp. on 
July 12, 1983, shall complete said purchase according to the 
terms set forth in said agreement. Upon such assignment having 
been made by Mr. and Ms. Wixen and upon our receipt of written 
notice of the same, Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have no further 
rights, obligations, or liabilities hereunder, all such rights, 
obligations and liabilities having been fully transferred and 
assigned to Val Ban Corp. Upon the conveyance of the undivided 
one-half interest in the properties from Val Ban Corp.-t,o-
Mr. and Ms. Wixen, Val Ban Corp. shall be released by us from 
its obligations under the promissory note (referred to in 
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paragraph 2(c) above. provided that Mr. and Ms. Wixen assume 
such promissory note obligation. 
4. Prorations and Closing Costs 
The rents, taxes. insurance,, and utilities will be 
prorated as of the date of closing and appropriate credits of 
debits made to each of us. Taxes will be prorated on the basis 
of 1983 property taxes with a final adjustment to be made in 
November. 1984. at such time as the exact amount of 1984 taxes 
is Known. It is contemplated that you will make similar 
adjustments with First Security Bank of Utah relating to the 
proration of rents. We will pay costs of recording deeds to 
you and the loan fee to First Security Bank in the approximate 
amount of $14,500. We and you will share equally the escrow 
fee. Each of the parties hereto will bear their own attorney's 
fees and costs for preparation of this agreement and in 
connection with the closing. 
5. Leases 
We heretofore delivered to you true, correct and 
complete originals of all tenant leases pertaining to the 
properties being sold to you. Such leases are valid and 
binding documents and are in full force and effect. Except for 
such leases, there are no other agreements in connection with 
leasing of said property between us and such tenants with 
respect to the properties. No party thereunder has any right, 
with the giving of notice or lapse of tine or both, to 
terminate any lease or assert any claim thereunder* except as 
set forth in said leases. At the closing, we will by 
instrument satisfactory to you transfer, convey and assign to 
you all of our interest in said leases, including the right to 
receive rents thereunder. Prior to the closing, we will obtain 
for you letters from said tenants confirming the leases, and 
prepaid rents and in addition we will prepare and execute a 
joint letter advising the tenants of the transfer of ownership 
to you and directing such tenants to pay rents to you. Such 
transfer will not constitute a default under any of such 
leases. We will resolve any differences asserted by said 
tenants as it relates to prepaid rents or offsets claimed 
against future rentals becoming due under the terms of the said 
leases, and pay you for the amount of any such difference. 
Prepaid rents and security deposits will be accounted for and 
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paid to you at closing and you will be obligated for such 
deposits in accordance with the terms of said leases. 
6. Personal Property 
At the time of closing a bill of sale without 
warranties evidencing the sale by us^to you'of'the equipment 
and personal property locatfed^ at'the^ tfaffftetn WthdsRestaurant. 
a comple€6fclist of which is set forth on Exhibit "D" attached 
hereto, will be provided to you relating to such equipment and, 
personal property. 
7: Preliminary Title Reports 
We have delivered to you this date copies of 
Preliminary Title Reports prepared by Rome Abstract Company 
relating to the properties being sold, together with copies of 
various documents which are referred to in the said title 
reports. We represent and warrant that, except for those 
matters explicitly described in such Preliminary Title Reports, 
there are no liens, claims or encumbrances existing or which, 
based on facts existing prior to the closing, may be asserted 
against any of the properties. The proposed Section 1031 
exchange transaction will be closed through Home Abstract 
Company. An ALTA Owner's Extended Coverage Title Policy in the 
amount of $3,530,104.9S will be provided to vou throuah Home 
Abstract Company atf-oux ^ xpentfef. 
8. Allocation of Values 
The allocation of the purchase price or the respective 
properties being sold by us to you will be set forth in a 
Schedule approved by all parties at closing. 
9. Commissions 
We have made arrangements to pay Century 21 Harmston 
Realtors and Wixen Realty, a commission in the total amount of 
$38,000 with Wixen Realty to receive 50\ thereof, in connection 
with the sale and you are not responsible for payment of any 
commission in connection with the subject transaction. 
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10. Warranties 
At c los ing we w i l l a s s i g n to you a l l contract 
warranties from third par t i e s per ta in ing to the subject 
propert ies as they r e l a t e to any personal property, the 
s t ruc tures , or any component parts thereof and we w i l l make a 
reasonable e f fort t o n f o c a t e and d e l i v e r copies of a l l documents 
in our f i l e s with respetftr ttrereto. "TTft addit ion, we w i l l 
delTver*to you at c l o s ing a l l o r i g i n a l building contract s , 
p lans , permits, and other documents pertaining to the 
propert ies purchased or the cons truct ion of same. We have 
advised you most of the propert ies were constructed without 
wr i t t en building contrac t s . 
11. Possession 
Possession of the properties being sold shall be 
delivered at the date of closing. 
12. Closing Date 
The closing date of this transaction and "closing" as 
used herein shall be May 4, 1984, or as said date shall be 
extended by mutual agreement between us. In the event said 
closing does not occur on said date or on the date of extension 
of the closing as mutually agreed to between us. each party 
shall have all remedies provided for by law. 
13. Representations 
We have previously represented to you and we hereby 
affirm, to the best of our Knowledge and belief, that the 
subject properties are in compliance with all applicable 
building rules and regulations, and there are no violations of 
any statutes or judicial orders pertaining to the subject 
properties. The subject properties are in compliance with all 
applicable zoning rules and regulations. There are no judicial 
orders specifically pertaining to the subject properties. We 
have provided you with copies of any special permits or 
conditional use permits relating to operation of the subject 
properties. There are no lawsuits, administrative proceedings, 
arbitrations or other proceedings pertaining to the subject 
properties or affecting such properties and to the best of our 
knowledge none have been threatened and there are no 
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governmental investigations relating thereto. In the event 
suit is filed by any third party to enjoin closing of the 
transaction or to rescind the sale transaction, ve will defend 
said action at our sole cost and expense. 
Stacey Properties is a Utah limited partnership which 
has been duly formed and is validly existing under the lavs of 
the State of Utah, and has all powers and authorities and all 
material governmental licenses, authorizations, consents and 
approvals required to carry on the business as now conducted by 
it, to own the properties being sold hereunder, to enter into 
this agreement, to execute and deliver the bill of sale, the 
deeds and the assignments contemplated hereby and to perform 
all of its obligations hereunder and thereunder. J. Ron Stacey 
is the owner of the Commonwealth Square property. The 
execution, delivery and performance by us of this agreement are 
within our power, have been duly authorized by all necessary 
action, require no action by or in respect of, or filing with, 
any partner or any governmental body, agency or official or any 
other party and do not contravene, or constitute a default 
under, any provision of applicable law or regulation or of the 
documents by which we were created and are governed or of any 
agreement, judgment, injunction, order, decree or other 
instrument binding upon us or result in the creation or 
imposition of any lien, charge, encumbrance or security 
interest on any of the properties being sold hereunder. We 
have delivered to you true and complete copies of all of the 
documents by which we were created and are governed which are 
valid and binding and are in full force and effect. We have 
not entered into any contract with any person to manage the 
properties or operate any portion thereof. 
14. Termite Inspection 
At the closing we will provide you with a standard 
inspection certificate indicating no terminate infestation 
issued by a recognized exterminator following inspection of the 
properties sold hereunder. 
15. Survey 
At the closing we will furnish to you surveys prepared 
by a registered surveyor showing the properties being sold and 
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the location of buildings thereon, the location of any streets, 
rights of way, or rights of access. 
16. Conditions 
(i) Your obligation to purchase the properties is 
expressly conditioned upon the following: 
a. That you obtain a loan from First Security 
BanK of Utah in accordance with the terms set forth in 
the letter from First Security to you dated March 27. 
1984. or as said loan is amended or altered by mutual 
agreement between you and the bank; 
b. That all representations and warranties made 
by us shall be true and correct on and as of the date 
of closing as if made on such date; 
c. That we shall have fully performed and 
complied with all of the obligations to be performed 
by us in this agreement; 
d. That you shall have received an opinion from 
our attorneys. Berman & Anderson, in the form set 
forth on Exhibit "EM hereto; 
e. That the assumption of the Post Office 
building mortgage has been approved by State Savings 
and Loan Association and the interest rate thereon 
shall not exceed 11 1/2% per annum; and 
f. That there shall have been no material 
adverse change in any of the properties or title 
thereto since April 1. 1984. 
(ii) Our obligation to sell the properties 
is expressly conditioned upon the following: 
(a) That First Security Bank release us from all of 
our obligations and liabilities to said Bank; 
(b) That you shall have fully performed and complied 
with all of the obligations to be performed by you in this 
agreement; 
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(c) That J. Ron Stacey and Geraldine Stacey shall be 
released from any liability to State Savings and Loan 
Association arising in connection with the Post Office mortgage 
being assumed by you. 
17. Indemnity 
We agree to indemnify, defend and hold you harmless 
and reimburse you on demand from and against, for, and with 
respect to any claim, liability, obligation, loss, damage, 
deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost or expense (including 
without limitation reasonable attorneys1 fees and expenses, and 
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in investigating, 
preparing or defending against any litigation or claim), 
action, suit, proceeding or demand, of any kind or character, 
arising out of or in any manner incident, relating or 
attributable to: 
a. any breach or failure of any representation 
or warranty given by us contained in this agreement or 
in any certificate, instrument, assignment, conveyance 
or transfer, or other document or agreement executed 
by either of us in connection with this agreement; 
b. any failure of either of us to perform or 
observe, or to have performed or observed, in full, 
any covenant, agreement, or condition to be performed 
or observed by us under this agreement or under any 
certificate or other instrument, document or agreement 
executed by us in connection with this agreement; 
c. the assertion by any person of any claim, 
liability, obligation, agreement or undertaking which 
relates to the properties or which in any manner 
affects title to the properties which arises out of 
any facts, transactions or circumstances occurring on 
or prior to the closing date; or 
d. the enforcement of your rights under this 
agreement. 
18. Survival. 
The representations, warranties and covenants given by 
us contained herein and the certificates delivered at the 
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closing or otherwise delivered pursuant to this agreement, 
shall survive the closing without regard to any investigation 
made by you. 
19. Waiver and Modification. 
This agreement may not be amended, modified, 
superseded or cancelled, and none of the terms, covenants, 
representations, warranties or conditions, may be waived except 
by written instrument executed by all of us and for, or, in the 
case of a waiver, by the party waiving compliance. Failure of 
any party at any time or times to require strict performance of 
any provision hereof shall not in any manner affect the right 
of such party at a later date to enforce the same. No waiver 
by any party of the breach of any term, covenant, 
representation or warranty contained in this agreement as a 
condition to such party's obligations hereunder, shall 
constitute a release or affect any liability resulting from 
said breach. 
20. Successors in Interest; Assignment. 
This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the successors and assigns of the parties. Except 
as provided herein, no assignment of any rights and delegations 
of any obligations for which provision is made in this 
agreement may be made by any party without the prior written 
consent of the other party. 
If the foregoing sets forth the terms of our 
understanding, please execute this agreement where set forth 
below. 
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^acepted and agreed to this 
_Z^4_day pf April- 1984. 
Ben Wixen 
x> ~*~~ W i x e n 
MuJ 
A/td 
Bernie Goler 
fo^ytyyvcL Jb&j 
l^Lt+ViUxj 
Bonnie Goler 
4066a 
050184 
Clark Waddoups, Esq. , 1*3975 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq., #A4134 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR 4 CROCKETT 
Attorneys for .Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (301) 532-7840 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER AND BONNIE GOLER, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. ; 
J. RON STACEY, ] 
Counterclaim ] 
Defendant. ] 
PINDINGS OP PACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Civil No. 90743 
This matter , having been tr ied to the Court on May 28, 
29 , and 30, 1986, and p l a i n t i f f and J* Ron Stacey having been 
represented by Robert K. Anderson and William P. Schwartz, and 
defendants having been represented by Clark Waddoups and Ronald 
G. Russe l l , and the Court, having heard the evidence and argument 
of counsel , hereby makes the following f ind ings and conclusions: 
EXHIBIT "B" 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 22, 1984, plaintiff Stacey Properties, 
counterclaim defendant J. Ron Stacey, and defendants Ben Wixen, 
Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler entered into a 
written agreement (the "Agreement") whereby certain properties 
were sold by plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey to defendants, including 
the main Ogden post office located in Ogden, Utah, and the 
Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in Sunset. Utah. 
2. As partial payment for the properties, defendants 
executed an $80,000 promissory note dated Nay 22, 1984, payable 
to plaintiff in monthly installments of $731.79, beginning on 
June 1, 1984 (the "Note"). 
3. Defendants paid to plaintiff $744.60 on August 1, 
1984; and $731.79 on August 29, 1984. 
4. The Note contains a provision concerning offsets 
which states: 
Contemporaneous with Makers1 execution of 
this Note, Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey 
("Stacey") have executed a letter agreement 
relating to the sale and purchase of certain 
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber 
Counties, State of Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 
of said letter agreement, Properties and Stacey 
agree to indemnify, defend, and hold Makers 
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand from 
and against, for, and with respect to inter alia, 
any claim, liability or obligation relating ro 
attributable to any breach of failure of any 
representation or warranty given by Properties 
and Stacey contained in the letter agreement 
. . . . or any failure of either of 
-2-
them to perform any covenant to be performed 
under such agreement or any such instrument* 
Makers shall have the right to offset against 
any amounts due or to become due to 
Properties under this Note any such 
reimbursement due to Makers under Section 17 
of said letter agreement or under any other 
provision thereof . . ., provided, however, 
that Makers give Properties written notice of 
the amount to be offset and the specific 
reasons therefor. 
5. On September 5, 1984, defendants sent written 
notice to plaintiff asserting an offset against amounts due or to 
become due under the Note for expenses incurred by defendants in 
replacing an air-conditioning unit at the Ogden post office. The 
amount and specific reasons for the offset were stated in that 
letter. 
6. Defendants did not make the September, 1984 
monthly payment under the Note and made no payments under the 
Note after claiming said offset. As of May 1, 1986, the total of 
unpaid installments under the Note was $16,099.38. 
7. Plaintiff sent a letter to defendants on September 
12, 1984 asserting that it was accelerating the entire balance 
due and owing under the Note and further asserting that 
defendants had failed to make payments in th-? time and manner 
required by the Note. The Note provides: 
In the event this Note, or any obligation 
provided to be satisfied or performed under 
any agreement, instrument or document 
connected with or related to this Note, now 
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not 
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and 
in the manner required, Properties, at its 
option and without notice, may declare the 
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest 
immediately due and payable and makers agree 
to immediately pay the same. 
8. The Agreement provides: 
(Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey] agree 
to remedy any latent defects in materials or 
worHcnanship which arise within a one year 
period from the date of closing, we 
represent and warrant to you that all 
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and 
sewer systems at the properties are in 
working order and will be operative at 
closing . • . .,We will perfora all necessary 
repairs to the roof of the Ogden post office 
building which are reasonably required to 
maintain a watertight roof surface for a 
period of sixty-seven mpnths from the date of 
closing at our sole cost and expense. 
9. At trial, defendants claimed offsets against th^ 
Note for the following items and amounts: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
Ogden Post Office Air 
Conditioner Replacement 
Commonwealth Sewer Repair 
Ogden Post Office Roof 
Commonwealth Sidewalk Repair 
Commonwealth Electrical Repair 
Property Tax Adjustment 
Commonwealth Pire Sprinkler 
$25,063, 
$ 1,037, 
$43,750, 
$ 7,600, 
$ 1,409. 
$ 3,028, 
$ 1,190. 
.80 
.83 
.00 
.00 
.70 
.52 
.00 
10. Defendants provided plaintiff with written notice 
of each claimed offset, which notice stated the amounts claimed 
and reasons therefor* 
11• According to the evidence presented, the Court's 
findings regarding the offsets claimed by defendants are as 
follows: 
a. Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit, 
(1) The air-conditioning unitr according 
to the circumstantial evidence presented, was 
not in working order and was not operative on 
May 22, 1984? 
(2) The air-conditioning unit had an 
expected useful life of approximately fifteen 
years; 
(3) On May 22, 1984, the unit would have 
had approximately 25% of its useful life 
remaining under normal conditions; 
(4) Plaintiff was notified by Eugene 
Perren of the post office by at least May 29, 
1984 that the air-conditioning unit was not 
operable. Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed 
to make repairs to the unit after receiving 
notice from the post office that the unit was 
inoperable; 
(5) Defendants incurred a total expense 
of $22,758.00 to replace the air-conditioning 
unit, the first installment of which in the 
amount of $6,000 was paid on August 21, 1984. 
b. Commonwealth Square Sewer System. 
(1) Defendants discovered a lS'-lS" gap 
in a sewer pipe at Commonwealth Square within 
one year of Kay 22, 1984, which gap was never 
remedied by plaintiff or J. Ron Stacey. 
(2) The subject gap was not discovered 
prior to closing and could not have been 
discovered by a reasonable inspection due to 
its nature and location; 
(3) Defendants incurred an expense of 
$1,037.83 to repair said gap. 
c. Ogden Post Office Roof. 
(1) The Ogden .post office roof has 
leaked on numerous occasions following 
closing and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs which 
were reasonably required to maintain a 
watertight roof surface; 
(2) According to the evidence presented 
by defendants, the cost of replacing the post 
office roof with a new "twenty year" roof 
would be $49,000; 
(3) The age of the roof at the date of 
closing was approximately twelve years; 
(4) Defendants have not incurred any 
out-of-pocket expenses to repair said roof as 
of the time of trial. 
d. Commonwealth Square Sidewalk. 
(1) The sidewalks at Commonwealth Square 
are currently in a defective condition in 
several places; 
(2) The defects were discoverable by 
defendants prior to May 22, 1984? 
e. Commonwealth Electrical System., 
(1) Defendants failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the 
Commonwealth electrical system was not in 
working order at the date of closing. 
f• Property Tax Adjustment. 
(1) Defendants failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that plaintiff owed 
defendants additional amounts pursuant to the 
parties1 agreement to adjust the property 
taxes payable by the parties according to the 
actual 1984 tax assessment. 
(2) Plaintiff moved at the start of 
trial to amend its Complaint to include a 
claim for the property tax proration owed 
plaintiff by defendants, which motion was 
granted. 
(3) Defendants have failed to make 
payment to plaintiff of $958.10 for which the 
tenants at Commonwealth were responsible and 
for which plaintiff claimed a pro-rata 
credit. 
g. Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System. 
(1) Defendants failed to present any 
evidence that the fire sprinkling system at 
Commonwealth Square was not in working order 
at the date of closing, 
12. These Findings of Fact shall be construed to be 
Conclusions of Law to the extent that same may be found to 
constitute Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
13. The Court makes the following conclusions with 
respect to each of the claimed offsets: 
a. Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit. 
(1) The east air-conditioning unit at 
the Ogden post office was not in working 
order and operative on May 22, 1984 in breach 
of the terms of the Agreement; 
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall 
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held 
responsible for the entire cost of 
replacement; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to offset 
against amounts due or to become due under 
the Note the amount of $5,689.50, which is 
25% of the total replacement cost of the air 
conditioner incurred by defendants, together 
with prejudgment interest on that amount at 
12% per annum from August 21, 1984 to May 30, 
1986 or $1,209.89. 
_ Q . 
b. Commonwealth Sewer System. 
(1) A latent defect in the sewer system 
at Commonwealth Square Shopping Center arose 
within one year from May 22, 1984, which 
defect plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed to 
remedy in breach of the terns of the 
Agreement. 
(2) Defendants.are entitled to offset 
against amounts due or to become due under 
the Note the amount of $1,037.83 for costs 
incurred by defendants to repair said sewer 
system, together with pre-judgment interest 
on that amount from January lf 1985 to May 
30, 1986 or $175.72. 
c. Qgden Post Office Roof. 
(1) Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs which 
were reasonably required to maintain the 
Ogden post office roof in a watertight 
condition in breach of the terms of the 
Agreement? 
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall 
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held 
responsible for the entire cost of a new 
roof; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to recover 
against plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey an award 
of damages proximately resulting from said breach 
in cne amount of $12
 f 250, which is 25% of the 
cost of a new " twenty-year" roof; 
(4) Because defendants had incurred no 
out-of-pocket expenses with respect to said roof 
prior to trial, no offset against the Note arose 
under Paragraph 17 of the Agreement and the Note. 
(5) Plaintiff and J, Ron Stacey shall have no 
further obligations under the Agreement with 
respect to the Ogden post office roof from and 
after May 30, 1986* 
d. Commonwealth Square Sidewalk. 
(1) The defects claimed by defendants with 
respect to the Commonwealth Square Shopping 
Center were not latent defects within the terms 
of the agreement! 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any award 
with respect to said sidewalks. 
e. Commonwealth Electrical System. 
(1) The defendants have failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the Commonwealth 
electrical system was not in working order on Hay 
22, 1984. 
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(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to said electrical system. 
f. Property Tax Adjustment. 
(1) Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff 
and J. Ron Stacey are entitled to recover 
$958.10 from defendants jointly and 
severally, together with prejudgment interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum from January 1, 
1985 to May 30, 1986 in the amount of 
$162.22, as a pro-rata credit for property 
taxes which were paid or should have been 
paid to defendants by certain tenants. 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to property taxes. 
g. Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System. 
(1) Defendants presented no evidence 
that the Commonwealth fire sprinkling system 
was not in working order at the date of 
closing. 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to said system. 
14. The time at which a default justifying 
acceleration is measured is at the time of the attempted 
acceleration. No default had occurred on September 12, 1984 
justifying acceleration and the attempted acceleration by 
plaintiff was of no effect. 
15* Plaintiff was not entitled to accelerate the Note 
at the time the complaint was filed because the payments made by 
the defendants to replace the subject air conditioner exceeded 
amounts due under the Note on that date. 
16* Acceleration is a harsh remedy and the plaintiff 
is not entitled to acceleration as of the date of trial for the 
additional reason that acceleration should not be dependent upon 
the uncertainties of delays in bringing a case to trial. 
17. Because defendants are entitled to a money 
judgment with respect to damages awarded for breach of the 
agreement to maintain the post office roof, acceleration of the 
Note at this time would be inappropriate. 
18. The total amount awarded to defendants, including 
prejudgment interest, is to be offset against the cumulative 
monthly installments under the Note of §16,099.38 (as of May 1, 
1986) and against future installments under the Note until such 
amount has been fully satisfied. 
19. Pursuant to stipulation, defendants1 Fourth 
Counterclaim shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
20. Plaintiff did not prevail on its complaint for 
acceleration and is therefore not entitled to an award of 
attorney^ fees. 
21. The defendants would be entitled to an award of 
attorney1s fees if they had simply defended the case 
successfully, but are not entitled to an award of fees because 
they did not prevail on many of their counterclaims. 
22. All parties shall bear their own costs. 
23. These Conclusions of Law shall be construed to be 
Findings of Fact to the extent that the same may be found to 
constitute FinSings of Fact. '^r^\jj-
DATED this /*> day of Ju^ -trtrt, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
'*aage David B. Roth 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert M. Anderson of 
Hansen and Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and J, Ron Stacj 
RoHci/ld G. Ru&SelJ^of 
Lar/en, Kimball, Parr & Crockett 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimaints 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August 1986, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq* 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
May 25, 1984 
The Undersign hereby agrees to be liable as co-makers of that certain Promisory 
Note, as said Note as been modified by interlineations and additions previously 
agreed to by Val Ban Corp., Bernie and Bonnie Goler. 
A photo copy of said Note ( reflecting such modification Is attached hereto as 
Ehiblt "A". 
^uiAAjyPfJt ^CJI^QAJ 
Francine A. Wlxen 
EXHIBIT "A" 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$80,000.00 Salt Lake City, Utah 
May 2Jr 1984 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Makers'*) promise 
to pay to the order of STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership ("Properties"), or its assigns, the principal sum of 
Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00), together with interest on 
said principal sum, or the unpaid balance thereof, from and after 
the date hereof, at the rate of ten and one-half percent (10 
1/2Z) per annum. Principal and interest shall be paid in monthly 
installments of $731.79 each, payable on the first day of each 
month commencing June 1, 1984. Payments shall be applied first 
to accrued interest with the remainder applied to principal. The 
entire principal balance and all accrued interest shall be due 
and payable on the 1st day of May, 1994. 
Contemporaneous with Makers9 execution of this Note, 
Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey ("Stacey") have executed a 
letter agreement relating to the sale and purchase of certain 
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber Counties, State of 
Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 of said letter agreement, 
Properties and Stacey agree to indemnify, defend and hold Makers 
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand*from and against, for, 
and with respect to, inter alia, any claim, liability or 
obligation relating or attributable to any breach or failure of 
any representation or warranty given by Properties and Stacey 
contained in the letter agreement or any instrument executed by 
either of them in connection therewith or any failure of either 
of them to perform any covenant to be performed under such 
agreement or any such instrument. Makers shall have the right to 
offset against any amounts due or to become due to Properties 
under this Note any such reimbursement due to Makers under 
Section 17 of said letter agreement or under any other provision 
thereof or of any document executed in conjunction therewith, 
provided, however, that Makers give Properties written notice of 
the amount to be offset and the specific reasons therefor. 
In the event this Note, or any obligation provided to 
be satisfied or performed under any agreement, instrument or 
document connected with or related to this Note, now existing or 
otherwise, is breached or is not satisfied, performed or paid, at 
the time and in the'manner required, Properties, at its option 
and without rtbtice, may declare the unpaid principal balance and 
accrued interest immediately due. and payable and Makers agree to 
immediately pay the same. Makers agree to pay any and all costs 
and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and 
J & J ^ ^ - ^ . W ^ W P o r t l a w of ^ he Center to*Tensnts far 
purposes af jtaupancyT-ylenants 
whether j*incurre<i with ©r^without .suit or before or 'after 
judgment .^including 'reasonable' Attorneys' -:fees ) which "may bo 
incurred by or in connection'with the enforcement or performance 
of any of the "rights of Properties hereunder or under any 
agreement,'instrument or document connected with or related to 
this Hots. If principal or interest owing hereunder are not paid 
when due , 'interest shall thereafter accrue on the unpaid 
principal balance at the rate of eighteen percent (18X) per 
annum, both before and after Judgment. The entire balanee of 
principal and interest owing hereunder, shsll mature and be 
payable in the event of sale or transfer by Makers of all or any
 A 
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in AIL/,,. 
Sunset, Utah (-the Center-), provided, however, that (\)»j6h/e/ /lOftrC 
&/#&//&&&• (2) th# transfer of all or any portion of the 
Center to a corporation, partnership or other entity which is 
controlled by Makers or sny one of them or a lineal descendant kV 
*tt4Wfcr/of Makers or any one of them, or* (3) the transfer to a 
spouse,lineal descendant ui enueeuir of a Maker or to a trust 
naming a Maker or a spouse prlineal descendant AV/AAW$XAV of a 
Maker as a beneficiary, "shall not be deemed to accelerate the 
maturity date for payment of principal and interest owing 
hereunder.' The term "control** means ownership of more than/rrf£^one hundr 
percent £X0X) of the capital of a partnership or unincorporated /lrs//// 
entity or^Oie ownership of more than fifrV percent (JjOZ) of all MI*/(Al 
classes of stock of a corporation. one hunSred 1001 ^ 
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest 
and of non-payment of this Note are hereby waived. 
In the event Properties determines that it will sell or 
discount this Note, end if Makers are not then in default 
hereunder, then Properties shall offer the right to Makers to 
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer. 
This Note is executed din connection with and pursuant 
to the terms of the letter agreement above-mentioned and certain 
ether written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties 
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated into 
and by reference made a part of this Note. 
«» «± « *»»c * m*r, a « £ £ £ & • c*1"orai4 , , 
nit 18 in the Center (provided, however,,, ^ , , „, /O / £/t*r r**f*. 
Hat Makers shall pay Properties $10,0001>Y cS&CQ.*' h~*-**> " 
t the closing of such sale if, but only if, 
te price for such Unit 18 equals or 
xceeds $120,000) 
•the leasing of &- and all portions of the / iter to Tenants for 
purposes of occur ~y by Tenants, "^ 
whether incurred with or without suit or before or after 
judgment, including reasonable attorneys1 fees) which may be 
incurred by or in connection with the enforcement or performance 
of any of the rights of Properties hereunder or under any 
agreement, instrument or document connected with or related to 
this Note* If principal or interest owing hereunder are not paid 
when duei interest shall thereafter accrue on the unpaid 
principal balance at the rate of eighteen percent (18X) per 
annum, both before and after judgment. The entire balance of 
principal and interest owing hereunder shall mature and be 
payable in the event of sale or transfer by Makers of all or any 
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in J 
Sunset, Utah ("the Center"), provided, however, that (l)*tJv* £*y 
tgenafeg ef leasehold interests by Mahegs ef all eg any pegfcien 
of the Cent*r, (2) the transfer of all or any portion of the 
Center to a corporation, partnership or other entity which is. 
controlled by Makers or any one of them or a lineal descendant <er 
ancQCter of Makers or any one of them, +# (3) the transfer to a 
spouse^ lineal descendant eg ancestor of a Maker or to a trust 
naming a Maker or a spous%rf/ lineal descendant mw ansestor of a 
Maker as a beneficiary**shall not be deemed to accelerate the 
maturity date for payment of principal and interest owing 
hereunder* The term "control" means ownership of more than fifteyone' hi 
percent (W3rj*or*the capital of a partnership or unincorporated 
entity or the ownership of more than/fiicy percent (W9) of all 2*^ 
classes of stock of a corporation, one hundred 100% (j 
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest 
and of non-payment of this Note are hereby waived. 
In the event Properties determines that it will sell or 
discount this Note, and if Makers are not then in default 
hereunder,, then Properties shall offer the right to Makers to 
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer. 
This Note is executed in connection with and pursuant 
to the terms of the letter agreement above-mentioned and certain 
other written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties 
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated into 
and by reference made a part of this Note. 
VAL BAN CORP., a California 
**the sale or transfer by Makers of Unit 18 in the Center (provided, 
however, that Makers shall pay Properties $10,000.00 at the closm. 
Bernie G o l e r " 7~~ 
Bonnie Goler 
-3-
Clark Waddoups, Esq., #A3975 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq., #A4134 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR 6 CROCKETT 
Attorneys for pefendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEN WIXEN, PRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLBR AND BONNIE GOLER, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
J. RON STACEY, 
Counterclaim ] 
Defendant. j 
\ JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 90743 
This matter having been tried to the Court on Nay 28, 
29, and 30, 1986, the Honorable David Roth presiding, and 
Findings of Pact and Conclusion of Lav having been duly entered, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AMD DECREED as follows: 
1. That plaintiff Stacey Properties and J* Ron Stacey 
do recover from defendants and counterclaimants Ben Wixen, 
Prancine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler, the total sum of 
$1,120.32, which sum includes prejudgment interest accrued prior 
EXHIBIT MDM 
to May 30, 1986, together with interest thereon at the rate of 
12% per annum from May 30, 1986 until paid; 
2. That said defendants and counterclaimants do 
recover on their counterclaims from Stacey Properties and J. Ron 
Stacey the total sum of $20,362.94, which sum includes 
prejudgment interest accrued prior to May 30, 1986, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from May 30, 1986 
until paid; 
3. That the foregoing amount awarded to defendants and 
counterclaimants is hereby ordered offset against the cumulative 
monthly installments of $16,099.38 which are due as of May 1, 
1986 under that certain Promissory Note dated May 22, 1984 and 
payable to plaintiff (the "Note") and the remainder of such award 
is to be offset against future installments under the Note until 
such amount has been fully satisfied; 
4. That plaintiff's claim herein for acceleration of 
the Note is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; 
5. That plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey are released from 
any further obligation to maintain or repair the Ogden post 
office roof from and after May 30, 1986; 
6. That defendants1 and counterclaimants1 Fourth 
Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; and 
7. That none of the parties are awarded attorney's 
fees and all parties shall bear their own, costs. 
DATED this /J> day of Ju»$uofe> 1986. 
BY THE C5 
V j u f r j ^ D a v i d E. Roth 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert M. Anderson of 
Hansen and Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and J. Ron Stacey 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August, 1986, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing JODGMENT was 
hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq* 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Stacey Properties, a Utah ) OPINION 
limited partnership, ) (For Publication) 
Plaintiff, Appellant, ) 
and Cross-Respondent, ) 
v# ) Case No. 880127-CA 
Ben Wixen, Francine Wixen, 
Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellants. 
Before Judges Garff, Bench, and Jackson. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from final judgment on an action to 
accelerate the balance due on a promissory note. Defendants 
appeal from final judgment on their counterclaim for breaches 
of warranty and contract. There are three issues presented for 
review. First, did the trial court err in dismissing 
plaintiffs claim for acceleration of the balance owed on the 
promissory note? Second, did the court err in measuring 
damages to be awarded defendants on their counterclaim? Third, 
did the court err in failing to award attorney fees? We affirm 
in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
This dispute stems from the sale in May 1984 of several 
commercial properties located in and around Ogden, Utah. 
Stacey Properties Ltd. (Stacey), a Utah limited partnership, 
and J. Ron Stacey, general partner, sold the properties to 
defendants Ben and Francine Wixen and Bernie and Bonnie Goler, 
general partners of Golwix Properties (Golwix). The total 
purchase price exceeded $3.5 million, most of which was paid 
through Golwix's assumption of existing debt. Golwix also 
executed a promissory note in the amount of $80,000 payable in 
monthly installments to Stacey. 
The terms of the promissory note included an offset 
provision, an acceleration clause, and a provision for Stacey*s 
attorney fees in the event enforcement of the note became 
necessary. In conjunction with the note, a letter agreement 
w 
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memorializing the terms of the sale provided for, inter alia, 
express warranties on certain aspects of the properties and for 
Golwix's attorney fees for any breach of those warranties. 
The note and agreement were executed on May 22, 1984. On 
September 5, 1984, Golwix asserted an offset against payments 
due under the note. A week later, Stacey notified Golwix that 
the entire balance due under the note was being accelerated 
because of Golwix*s -default.- Stacey filed suit on December 
5, 1984, and Golwix counterclaimed. 
Trial before the court commenced on May 28/ 1986. After 
three days of testimony, the trial court determined that Golwix 
had failed to make a total of $16,099.38 in payments on the 
note by the time of trial. The court further determined that 
Golwix had established offsets totaling $6,727.33 for 
replacement of an air conditioner and repair of a sewer 
system. Golwix was also awarded $12,250 in damages on its 
counterclaim for replacement of a roof. The trial court found 
that there had been no default and denied Stacey*s demand to 
accelerate the balance due on the note. Neither party was 
found to be entitled to an award of attorney fees. Both 
parties appeal the judgment. 
ACCELERATION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE 
Although an acceleration clause Hwill be enforced in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties,- KIXX, Inc. v. 
Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Utah 1980), the 
remedy is a harsh one "not favored in the law." Williamson v. 
Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah 1976). 
Stacey contends on appeal that it should have been 
permitted to accelerate the due date of the principal balance 
of the promissory note according to the note's terms. The 
pertinent provision of the note states: 
In the event this Note, or any obligation 
provided to be satisfied or performed under 
any agreement, instrument or document 
connected with or related to this Note, now 
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not 
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and 
in the manner required, [Stacey], at its 
option and without notice, may declare the 
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest 
immediately due and payable and [Golwix] 
agree[s] to immediately pay the same. 
We examine this provision as we would a contract, since 
w[p]romissory notes . . . are contracts between the parties, 
and the rules of construction applicable to contracts apply to 
them.w First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lvgrisse, 647 P.2d 1268, 
880127-CA 2 
1272 (Kan. 1982). Furthermore, *[t]he interpretation of 
contract language presents us with a question of law on which 
we need not defer to the trial court's construction but are 
free to render our independent interpretation.- Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); see also Ted R. 
Brown & Assoc, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
Stacey claims on appeal that the ruling below discourages 
unsecured loans, creates a precedent opposed to the policy of 
prompt notification of default, and weakens the enforceability 
of acceleration provisions in general. We disagree. The 
essence of the ruling of the trial court is merely that 
acceleration was premature at the time of notification and 
unwarranted later because of the amount of Golwixfs offset. 
At the time Golwix notified Stacey of its offset claim, two 
of the four monthly installment payments due had been paid. 
There is testimony in the record that the parties had agreed to 
postpone payment of the initial monthly installment for one 
year. The remaining unpaid installment was due on September 1, 
1984, four days before Golwix sent notification of its offset. 
Prior to submission of its offset claim, Golwix had already 
paid or deferred three of the four installment payments due. 
On those facts, the court could reasonably find that no default 
had occurred at the time of the attempted acceleration. 
The court also found that acceleration was unwarranted 
because the amount of offsets asserted by Golwix exceeded the 
amount in arrears on the note. It is clear from the record 
that Golwix bargained for and received a contractual right of 
offset* The operative provision of the promissory note states: 
[Golwix] shall have the right to offset 
against any amounts due or to become due to 
[Stacey] under this Note any such 
reimbursement due to [Golwix] under Section 
17 of said letter agreement or under any 
other provision thereof or of any document 
executed in conjunction therewith, provided, 
however, that [Golwix] give[s] [Stacey] 
written notice of the amount to be offset 
and the specific reasons therefor. 
The trial court considered this provision along with the 
following provision of the letter agreement: 
The properties have been inspected by 
[Golwix] and are purchased "as is" . . . . 
[Stacey] agree[s] to remedy any latent 
defects in materials or workmanship which 
arise within a one year period from the date 
of closing. We represent and warrant to you 
that all heating, cooling, electrical, 
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plumbing and sewer systems at the properties 
are in working order and will be operative 
at closing and that the footings and 
foundations are free from material 
structural defects. . . . We will perform 
all necessary repairs to the roof of the 
Post Office building which are reasonably-
required to maintain a water tight roof 
surface for a period of sixty seven [sic] 
months from the date of closing at our sole 
cost and expense. 
When Golwix incurred a $22,758 expense to replace an air 
conditioner, it referred to the warranty provision of the 
letter agreement and exercised its contractual offset right 
under the promissory note. These two instruments could be 
reasonably construed together. Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 
1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987) (agreements which are related and 
executed contemporaneously must be construed as a whole and 
harmonizesd) . The trial court could also properly balance the 
acceleration and offset terms of the note, giving effect to 
each of the provisions of the entire agreement. Minshew v. 
Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978) (contractual 
provisions must be interpreted in light of the entire 
agreement, giving effect to every other provision). We 
conclude that the trial court was legally correct in holding 
that acceleration was unwarranted because the offset exceeded 
the total payments due on the note. See, e.g., Wells v. Cobb, 
455 So.2d 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (acceleration was 
improper where default had not occurred due to offset). 
Accordingly, acceleration was unwarranted prior to trial, and 
we affirm the ruling of the trial court.•*• 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES ON COUNTERCLAIM 
Stacey argues that the trial court erred in measuring 
damages to be awarded Golwix on its counterclaim. Much of the 
trial record is devoted to establishing the timing, cost, and 
extent of repairs needed on the various sale properties. Based 
on the factual findings, the trial court determined as a matter 
of law that Stacey was liable on only three of Golwix•s claimed 
offsets. The court found that: 1) Stacey had breached its 
contract to maintain a watertight roof at the post office 
property; 2) Stacey had breached its warranty that the cooling 
system at the post office was to be operative on the closing 
date; and 3) Stacey had breached its warranty to remedy any 
latent defects in materials or workmanship by failing to remedy 
a defect in the sewer system at the shopping center property. 
1. We need not reach the issue as to whether acceleration was 
warranted at the time of trial since the court's award to Golwix 
still exceeded the amount in arrears on the note even at that 
time. 
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Although the court awarded a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of 
the sewer repairs, the replacement costs for the roof and air 
conditioner were apportioned 25% to Stacey and 75% to Golwix. 
This apportionment is at issue on appeal. 
Damages recoverable in a breach of contract action are 
generally -those which arise naturally from the breach and 
which reasonably may be supposed to have been within the 
contemplation of the parties or are reasonably foreseeable.-
Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 1982).2 -Damages 
are properly measured by the amount necessary to place the 
nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract had 
been performed.- Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 
1982). 
A review of the amounts awarded to Golwix for the roof 
leads us to conclude that this rule was properly applied. The 
trial court's apportionment of the costs for roof replacement 
was based on evidence in the record that a new twenty-year roof 
would cost $49,000. Since Stacey had contracted to maintain 
the roof for approximately five years, the court reasonably 
found that Stacey should bear the cost of five years of a 
twenty-year roof, i.e., 25% of $49,000, or $12,250. 
The trial court likewise apportioned the actual replacement 
cost of the air conditioner. Golwix was awarded 25% of the 
replacement cost of $22,758, or $5,689.50. The court held that 
Golwix would "receive a windfall- if Stacey was held 
responsible for the full replacement cost. The award, however, 
fails to -place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as 
if the contract had been performed.- Alexander, 646 P.2d at 
695. Golwix contracted for a cooling system that was to be 
operable on the day of closing. What it received was an air 
conditioner that was not in working order on that date. Since 
the evidence indicates that the reasonable cost of repairing 
the unit would have been between $19,000 and $20,000, the 
court's award was insufficient to afford Golwix the benefit of 
its bargain. For that reason, the award for the air 
conditioner should be increased, on remand, to reflect the 
reasonable cost of repair. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Both parties sought, and were denied, attorney fees under 
provisions of the promissory note and letter agreement. Stacey 
based its claim for attorney fees on the following provision of 
the promissory note: 
2. We do not distinguish the breach of warranty claim from the 
breach of contract claim as M[a]n action for breach of warranty 
may sound in either contract or tort.- Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985). 
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[Golwix] agree[s] to pay any and all costs 
and expenses (regardless of the particular 
nature thereof and whether incurred with or 
without suit or before or after judgment, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees) which 
may be incurred by or in connection with the 
enforcement or performance of any of the 
rights of [Stacey] hereunder or under any 
agreement/ instrument or document connected 
with or related to this Note. 
Golwix based its claim for fees on the following provision 
of the letter agreement: 
[Stacey] agree[s] to indemnify . . . and 
reimburse you . . . for . . . any claim 
. . . (including without limitation 
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses/ and 
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in 
investigating, preparing or defending 
against any litigation or claim)/ . . . 
arising out of or in any manner incident/ 
relating or attributable to: a. any breach 
or failure of any representation or warranty 
given by us . . . ; b. any failure of 
either of us to perform or observe . . . any 
covenant/ agreement, or condition to be 
performed or observed by us under this 
agreement or under any . . . other 
instrument . . . executed by us in 
connection with this agreement; . . . or 
d. the enforcement of your rights under this 
agreement. 
As a general rule, attorney fees may be recovered in Utah 
only if provided for by statute or contract. Cooper v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 757 P.2d 483/ 486 (Utah App. 1988). 
If attorney fees are recoverable by contract, M[a] party is 
entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful 
vindication of contractual rights within the terms of [the] 
agreement.- Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). 
The court below found that Stacey was not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees because it did not prevail on its 
complaint for acceleration. We consider this finding to be in 
accord with the language of the note, i.e./ Golwix will pay 
attorney fees in connection with the enforcement of Stacey's 
rights under the note. Since Stacey's attempt to accelerate 
the note was unsuccessful/ Stacey was properly denied its 
attorney fees. 
In regards to Golwix's claim for attorney fees, the trial 
court found that it was "not entitled to an award of fees 
because [it] did not prevail on many of [its] counterclaims." 
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The letter agreement provides, however, for the reimbursement 
of Golwixfs attorney fees incurred in enforcing any claims for 
breach of warranty or failure of performance. The contractual 
provision is expansively written, encompassing a broad range of 
potential expenses connected with rights arising under the 
contract. The mere fact that Golwix failed to prevail on some 
of their counterclaims does not justify a withholding of fees 
to which they were contractually entitled. "Provisions in 
written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees should 
ordinarily be honored by the courts." Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983). Golwix was not only successful in its 
opposition to acceleration of the note, it was also successful 
on some of its counterclaims. Therefore, even with partial 
success, Golwix was entitled to attorney fees for the claims on 
which it was successful. See Travner, 688 P.2d at 858 (each 
party was entitled to attorney fees where each was partially 
successful). We conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to give effect to the broad contractual 
language and partial success of Golwix in enforcing its 
contractual rights. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to Golwix. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson,^uudge 
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